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The differences between habeas corpus and due process are
important. The Due Process Clause, among other things, regulates
the procedures that the government must use before it detains a
person and holds the person in custody. But the Suspension Clause
safeguards a more elemental habeas privilege. That is, under the
Suspension Clause, the judge examines the bare question of whether
a person is being held in custody legally. In Habeas Corpus and Due
Process, I focus on the independent role of the habeas process.' The
deep confusion between habeas corpus and due process arises from a
critical area of overlap: the habeas judge may examine not only the
bare lawfulness of the custody, but also whether officials complied
with required procedures to detain the person, including due process
requirements.
I am so grateful to Professors Lee B. Kovarsky and Stephen I.
Vladeck for their insightful comments and responses to my Article.' I
have long benefitted from Professor Vladeck's work, as is apparent
throughout my Article. 3 Professor Kovarsky and I share an even more
direct interest in getting the distinctions between habeas process and
other forms of process right: we are just now completing a federal
habeas corpus casebook that we have co-authored. 4 While responses
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and habeas corpus. Professor Vladeck notes that he co-authored an amicus brief on
behalf of legal historians and habeas corpus experts and in support of certiorari in
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Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 2013 WL 57582 (2013) (No. 12-6615) (cert. denied). I
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to my original Article by colleagues who do not share my sympathies
and approach might have generated arguments with more friction
and sharper points of disagreement, my common interests with
Professors Kovarsky and Vladeck produced very interesting
connections, which I explore further in the brief comments that
follow.
I
HABEAS CORPUS STANDING ALONE
Habeas corpus and due process should be viewed apart and also
as complements, as Professor Kovarsky rightly emphasizes.5 Due
process cannot satisfy the demand that a habeas judge examine
whether custody is legal. Nor can availability of habeas review reduce
the obligation to comport with the Due Process Clause. In my
Article, I emphasized how one of the surprises to many
commentators of the Boumediene v. Bush6 decision was how the Court
discussed the affirmative obligation of ajudge to use habeas corpus to
meaningfully review the custody of detainees, independent of any
prior procedures used to review their custody.7 But habeas scholars
may have been less surprised by these developments. Professor
Vladeck, for example, had powerfully made many of these points in
important prior works. Moreover, the Supreme Court has long noted
the importance of habeas corpus ensuring a judicial forum to review
executive detentions that have never previously been reviewed by a
judge.
I made statements in my Article that the "Suspension Clause
demands that habeas corpus remain in full force where there was no
adequate prior judicial process"8 and that "the Suspension Clause can
ensure that habeas corpus begins where due process ends."
I
intended these statements to emphasize the heightened importance
of habeas corpus in such situations, rather than to suggest that that
process is fungible. I hope that I equally forcefully emphasized that
habeas process plays a "powerful, independent, and unappreciated
role standing alone."" The power of habeas process is its elemental
and constant demand that a judge examine whether a prisoner's
custody is legally authorized.
The Boumediene decision was clear that "the fundamental

5

Kovarsky, supra note 2, at 1-2.
6 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
7 See Garrett, supra note 1, at 87 ("The [Boumediene] Court . . . articulated
throughout that it relied on the Suspension Clause alone to secure habeas process
independent of any prior process.").
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procedural protections of habeas corpus" do not depend in any way
on due process rights;" in fact the Court noted that even if
administrative procedures used to screen enemy combatant detainees
were assumed to "satisfy due process standards, it would not end our
inquiry." 2 Therefore, I view Boumediene as quite emphatic that the
Suspension Clause entitled executive detainees to a judicial habeas
process apart from any prior status determination.
That said, the Supreme Court has linked the two concepts of
habeas corpus and due process in one unavoidable way and in one
unfortunate way. Let's start with the unfortunate one. I agree with
Professor Kovarsky that it was particularly unfortunate that all nine
Justices in Boumediene agreed that an "adequate" substitute for habeas
corpus is possible.
The Boumediene opinion need not have reached
that question, and the Court in some places undermined the
directness of its reasoning by digressing, perhaps because of Justices'
interest in making a more comprehensive statement of their habeas
However, the Court in Boumediene was right to
jurisprudence.
emphasize that any substitute for habeas corpus should be rarely
tolerated, and only then where the substitute is not merely
"adequate," but rather a near-identical form of judicial review. The
Court could have made much clearer the fact that the situations in
which it had approved such a "substitute" in the past were very
limited situations, which were not designed to limit access to judicial
review, and were not complete substitutes for habeas (e.g., each such
statute contains a Savings Clause permitting some resort to habeas
corpus 14 ).
The unavoidable way that the Boumediene Court linked habeas
corpus and due process was to address what it means for a judge to
offer a detainee a "meaningful opportunity" to demonstrate unlawful
confinement.'1
The Court did not detail the process that the
Suspension Clause required, although it did provide some direction
to the lower courts. Perhaps the Court could have provided more
specific directions to lower courts, or perhaps the Court should have
intervened as the case law developed in the years since Boumediene.
The Court in Boumediene did suggest that, while not absolved of
their independent obligation to examine the legality of custody,
11

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
12 Id. at 785.
13 See Kovarsky, supra note 2, at 7-8.
14 As I discuss in Part II.B.2 of my Article, the Court cited to United States v. Hayman,
342 U.S. 205 (1952) and Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977), both of which dealt with
post-conviction statutes designed to replicate habeas corpus and which created safety-valve
provisions designed to permit recourse to habeas filings. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 8384. The relevant statutes from Hayman and Swain are published at 28 U.S.C. § 2255
3
(2006); D.C. CODE § -110(g) (2001).
15 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779.
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federal judges may defer to administrative development of a factual
record.b But such deference may not be justified at all if the prior
evaluators were not federal judges or if they followed shoddy
procedures. Framing the deference to prior factfinding as a question
of whether the prior process is an adequate "substitute" to habeas
corpus is problematic, though the notion that federal judges may at
times defer to the findings of others who have previously approved
custody is not.
Since habeas corpus is a judicial power, it is only as strong as the
reviewing judges. When federal judges are reluctant to exercise the
writ, perhaps when faced with challenges to executive assertions of
power over prisoners, there may be little that the Supreme Court can
do except to exhort judges to take their roles seriously.
II
AN APPLICATION TO EXTRADITION

On the subject of judges reluctant to meaningfully examine the
authorization for custody, Professor Vladeck's response explores a
troubling extradition case ruling in which, having concluded that
administrative officials satisfied due process, the court ordered that
no further inquiry into the legality of custody should follow." The
Ninth Circuit in the Trinidad y Garcia case," as Professor Vladeck
describes, was badly split in its en banc ruling regarding a claim by an
extraditee that he would face torture upon removal. Statutes and
regulations describe what the Secretary of State must do to comply
with treaty obligations before extraditing a detainee who makes a
torture claim. Specifically, the Secretary must make a determination
of whether torture will "more likely than not" occur.''
The per
curiam opinion held that "[t] he process due here is that prescribed
by the statute and implementing regulation.""' That may be true for
the Secretary. But how about for the federal judge: is the judge to
defer completely to the Secretary, or must the judge inquire into
whether there may be torture upon extradition? The per curiam
opinion stated that if the Secretary provides a declaration of
compliance with the statute and regulations, then "the court's inquiry
shall have reached its end and Trinidad y Garcia's liberty interest
shall be fully vindicated."'

16
17

See id. at 782.
See Vladeck, supra note 2, at 22.
18 Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per
curiam).
19 22 C.F.R. § 95.2(b) (2012).
20 Trinidady Garcia, 683 F.3d at 957.
21 Id. The Court added, "[tio the extent that we have previously implied greater
judicial review of the substance of the Secretary's extradition decision other than
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Some of the Ninth Circuit judges went further and argued that
the process due was simply the statutory process, and therefore the
judge would not inquire into the legality of the custody at all." Two
concurring judges argued that "the scope of habeas review allows
courts to examine whether the Secretary has complied with her nondiscretionary obligations." 3 Under that view, apparently the view of
the plurality, the role of the federal judge is simply to ensure that the
Secretary of State in fact complied with the procedural obligations.
That reasoning conflates due process with habeas corpus. Even
assuming that the Secretary complied with the applicable procedures,
the federal habeas judge has an independent obligation to assure
that the custody is legal. The decision whether to approve the
extradition may be deferential to factfinding conducted by the
Secretary, and it may take into account that further judicial process is
anticipated in the receiving country (although here the detainee
alleges that he faced torture). However, the federal judge is not
absolved of the obligation to make some determination of the legality
of the custody. I therefore completely agree with Professor Vladeck
that the real question is how much process provides the detainee with
the "meaningful opportunity" that the Suspension Clause requires. I
also agree that it is somewhat counterintuitive that sometimes habeas
corpus entails more process than the Due Process Clause requires.
That is the elemental power of habeas corpus.
III
WHEN Is REVIEW COLLATERAL?

How about the converse problem: whether the presence of
habeas corpus as a form of review of custody can reduce the
obligation to comport with due process? I did not focus on the
interesting question that Professor Kovarsky develops, 4 and I agree
with him that there is no good argument that more collateral process
can somehow make up for an absence of prior process. The Hamdi
plurality, as Professor Kovarsky describes well, 5 certainly muddies the
waters by, in places, hinting at something along those lines. One of
the welcome aspects of the Boumediene opinion was the added clarity
on the differences between habeas process and prior process: the
Court emphasized that whether the custody is legal is a separate
habeas question, regardless of what procedures were used to establish
custody.
Indeed, in cases like Boumediene in which prisoners
compliance with her obligations under domestic law, e.g., Cornejo-Barretov. Seifert, 218
F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000), we overrule that precedent."
22 See id. at 984 (Tallman,J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 961 (Thomas, J., concurring) (oined by Wardlaw, J.).
24 See Kovarsky, supra note 2, at 10-14.
25 See id. at 4-5.
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challenge executive detention, habeas corpus is not even clearly
"collateral," since there has been no prior judgment orjudicial ruling
of any kind. Habeas may be the first judicial review. As Professor
Kovarsky develops in a forthcoming article, habeas corpus is a power
of Article III judges.b
The Boumediene Court emphasized the
importance of having an "Article III court in the exercise of its habeas
corpus function" review the record supporting a detention.27 While a
judge might have reason to defer to a judgment of another judge, or
even factfinding by an administrative agency, a judge has no
obligation to defer to a mixed legal and factual conclusion reached
by a non-judge.

IV
FACTUAL REVIEW
Before Boumediene, many thought that the focus of the Supreme
Court's Suspension Clause jurisprudence was the need for a federal
judge to examine questions of law, particularly constitutional
questions. The Court explained in Bounmediene that habeas "entitles
the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is
being held pursuant to 'the erroneous application or interpretation'
of relevant law."28
Boumediene emphasized the need to examine questions of fact: is
this person the type of person whose custody is authorized?
Innocence claims bear a family resemblance to such claims regarding
the factual legality of custody. I agree completely with Professor
Kovarsky that claims of innocence assert a possible defect in prior
process and that procedural due process is a logical grounding for
the underlying claim. I have argued as much in other work focused
on innocence claims." ' However, as to the post-conviction habeas
process that the judge carries out-the authority to inquire into
newly discovered evidence,
conduct hearings, and develop
discovery-the Suspension Clause may support the authority of the
judge to do that work. The reasoning of Boumediene also undermines
the reasoning that the Court adopted when declining to recognize a
Due Process or Eighth Amendment actual innocence claim: that
habeas judges traditionally lacked the ability to examine factual
questions.
Boumediene and the rest of the executive detention
jurisprudence emphasize that habeas at its core is centrally
preoccupied with factual questions concerning whether a person's
26 See Lee B. Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013).
27 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 790 (2008).
28 Id. at 779 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302
(2001)).
29 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, ClaimingInnocence, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1629 (2008).
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custody is authorized. Why, as a constitutional matter, the Court
continues to view the question of the imprisonment of an innocent
person as non-cognizable is hard to fathom.
One of the many important questions relating to the role of
habeas judges as factfinders is before the Court this next Term: the
Court is considering whether to recognize an equitable innocencebased exception to the statute of limitations governing federal postconviction habeas.30
That case raises the type of question that
Boumediene and the Suspension Clause should influence: a question
not concerned with the scope of an underlying due process or other
constitutional claim, but rather with the equitable power of the
federal judge to develop factual evidence related to innocence and
excuse procedural defects in a case based on such factual evidence.
V
THE SHADOW OF THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE

The theme of the last part of my original Article is that the
shadow of the Suspension Clause may have influenced seemingly
unrelated statutes governing judicial review and habeas jurisprudence
across different areas of habeas corpus. 3' Perhaps there is some
common ground in cases that range from extradition to immigration
removal to national security detention to post-conviction challenges
to criminal convictions. Habeas corpus has long been thought of as
an internally specialized subject. Post-conviction lawyers have had
little reason to engage with lawyers litigating Guantanamo cases or
immigration removal challenges. The Suspension Clause, I argue,
suggests a common structure for judicial review. Article III does so as
well, but was not my focus. The Due Process Clause and other rights
provisions also structure what can be litigated in a challenge to the
legality of custody. The Suspension Clause structures the writ in a
different way.
The bare Suspension Clause command that a federal judge ask
whether a detainee's custody is authorized ensures a meaningful
process apart from the standards and procedures regulating initial
decisions to place individuals in custody. That core aspect of habeas
corpus has had a powerful gravitational effect on a host of doctrines.
In some key areas, legislators have tried to avoid Suspension Clause
problems, and in others, judges have interpreted statutes governing
judicial review to do the same. Even if the Court had avoided stating
the stark principle clearly before Boumediene, and even though the
Court did not develop many of the specific procedures to be followed
when deciding Boumediene, the elemental force of the Suspension

30
31

See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 527 (2012) (cert. granted).
Garrett, supra note 1, at 111-21.
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Clause will continue to ensure that detentions are reviewed. Habeas
corpus, more than due process, will haunt future efforts to strip
federal judges of their habeas power of inquiry.

